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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank International1 has received significant criticism.2 Though the 
outcome the Court reached may be reasonable, the “framework” 
that the Court uses fails to guide future inquiries of fringe patents 
such as the claim in Alice. The test, originally created in Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 3 
essentially determines subject matter eligibility by first 
determining whether a claim is not subject-matter eligible, and, if it 
is not, then by determining if it actually is eligible. 4  That 
description may be a slight embellishment, but nevertheless, the 
guidance the test gives for future disputes is minimal.  
Subject matter eligibility is broadly defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 
as “any new or useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.” 5  The Court has created implicit exceptions, found 
                                                
1 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
2 See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Valve Corp., No. SACV 13–1874–GW(FFMx), 2014 
WL 4772200, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (comparing the Alice test to 
Justice Stewart’s infamous phrase: “I know it when I see it”); Eclipse IP, LLC v. 
McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14–742–GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592, at 
*3 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014); Richard Lloyd, Alice Decision Makes Software 
Innovation Landscape Bleaker, Rader Claims, IAM Blog (Sep. 01, 2014), 
http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=32997d05-6cd8-49d9-af8d-
4a4888a4fcf2 (quoting former Federal Circuit chief judge Rader, referring to 
Mayo and its application to Alice: “It causes me great pain to recognise the worst 
case in patent law history doesn’t come out of India or Pakistan or Vietnam or 
China even, it comes from the United States as recently as a few years ago.”).  
3 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
4 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (“First, we 
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts . . . . [S]tep two of this analysis [is] a search for an ‘inventive 
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to 
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent 
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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nowhere in the statute, for “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”6 Since patent claims are composed of elements,7 
some of which may fall within the implicit exceptions while others 
may not, a claim that is part statutory and part non-statutory can be 
difficult to characterize. These claims are a hybrid mixture of 
statutory and non-statutory elements.8 Much of the recent debate 
about the scope of § 101 involves these hybrid claims.9 This article 
proposes a test to procedurally determine the patentability of a 
hybrid claim. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the historical 
development of the law handling hybrid patent claims. Part III 
explains the current test as created in Mayo and Alice. Part IV 
argues that the current test is ambiguous, but also flexible and 
amenable to a proposed adapted test. In Part V, this article 
concludes that courts could use the proposed test in determining 
patentability of difficult hybrid patent claims.  
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Since “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, 
rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 
ideas,’”10 examples of hybrid claims that consist of both statutory 
and non-statutory elements could likely be found throughout the 
                                                
6 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 
(1981)). 
7 See generally MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 8.03 (3d ed. 
2014). 
8 See Ex parte Lyell, No. 89-0461, 1990 WL 354583, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 9, 
1990) (“We however do recognize that certain types of claims which appear to 
be ‘hybrid’ are permitted in U.S. patent practice.”). For a detailed discussion of 
hybrid claims, see 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 5:65–85 
(4th ed. 2013). 
9 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593, 597–99 (2010); Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of 
Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014). 
10 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (2014) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289 (2012)).  
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patent system’s history.11 Formal discussion on this topic began in 
the early 1950s with the judiciary responding to these types of 
claims by creating the “point-of-novelty” test.12 This section will 
explain this test and then examine the later cases of Parker v. 
Flook and Diamond v. Diehr and the conflict of law that began to 
build.13 
A. In re Abrams: Point of Novelty 
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA), the predecessor to the Federal Circuit, issued the clearest 
opinion articulating the point-of-novelty test. In re Abrams 14 
involved claims “for Petroleum Prospecting Method.”15 In this 
case, the non-statutory elements of the claim were objected to as 
“purely mental in character.”16 The illustrative claim four recites “a 
method of prospecting for petroliferous deposits” with six steps; 
the court determined the last three were “mental steps.”17 The first 
three steps were determined to be statutory elements: “sinking a 
number of boreholes,” “sealing off each said boreholes from the 
atmosphere,” and “reducing the pressure.”18 The three mental steps 
involved “measuring the rate of pressure rise,” “determining the 
rate . . . at a standard reference,” and “comparing the rates . . . to 
detect anomalies.”19 
Abrams asserted that analyzing mental-step claims such as this 
needed a logical rule to follow.20 Abrams’s brief proposed a rule, 
which the court appeared to adopt implicitly, that determines 
                                                
11 See MOY, supra note 8, § 5:65. 
12 See infra Parts II.A–B. 
13 See infra Parts II.C–D. 
14 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
15 Id. at 165. 
16 Id. 
17 See id.  
18 Id. (emphasis added). 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
20 Id. at 166. 
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patentability by sorting claims into one of three categories.21 The 
first category is where all method steps “are purely mental in 
character,”22 which would clearly not be patentable. The second 
and third are the difficult ones. The second category is where “a 
method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as 
so-called mental steps,” but the novelty is in the mental steps; 
“then the claim is considered unpatentable for the same reason that 
it would be if all the steps were purely mental in character.”23 The 
last category is where the novelty “resides in one or more of the 
positive and physical steps,” and contains patentable subject 
matter.24 
 
Though the court did not disagree with Abrams’s proposed rule 
in Abrams, it nevertheless found that the claim fell within the 
second category of claims.25 The court found steps “involving 
therein such purely mental terms as ‘determining’, ‘registering’, 
‘counting’, ‘observing’, ‘measuring’, ‘comparing’, ‘recording’, and 
‘computing’” to be non-statutory.26 Since the first two steps were 
determined to be “old for the purposes of the present application,” 
the novelty was in the final three steps, which involved measuring, 
determining, and comparing respectively. 27  Since the court 
determined that these terms were non-statutory, the claim failed the 
test.28 
                                                
21 See id. The court does not expressly state its approval of the test, but the court 
simply applies the test in making its determination. See id. at 167. 
22 Id. at 166. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 170 (“[I]t seems to us that they are eliminated from the applicability of 
appellant's proposed rule 3, and fall within No. 2.”). 
26 Id. at 167. 
27 Id. at 168. 
28 Id. 
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B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Point-of-Novelty Test 
The point-of-novelty test articulated in In re Abrams was 
prominent in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for about two 
decades before it began to fall out of favor from the courts.29 The 
strengths of the point-of-novelty test are that it is based on 
articulated rules and that the required novelty had to be in “both 
positive and physical steps.”30 But the test suffers from some 
significant weaknesses. First, it does not evaluate the claim as a 
whole.31 Second, there is some ambiguity about how to handle a 
claim when there is more than one single point of novelty.32 Third, 
when “the novelty does rest in the physical steps, the invention can 
properly be claimed by truncating the claim language to recite only 
the physical steps.”33 Largely in response to these shortcomings, 
the point-of-novelty test gradually fell out of favor.34  
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Gottschalk v. Benson, one 
of its first decisions to establish guidelines for patentability of 
computer programs. 35  The patent at issue was a method for 
“converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary 
numerals.”36 The Court found the claims far too broad to be 
eligible for patent protection.37 The Court declined to use the 
                                                
29 See Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“It remains 
our view that we need not be encumbered in our reasoning by the ‘Rules’ of 
Abrams for the reason that they have never enjoyed the approval of this court.”); 
MOY, supra note 8, § 5:66. 
30 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d at 166. 
31 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (holding that the claim 
should be viewed as a whole to determine patentability). 
32 Clearly if there is no novelty, the claim should not be considered valid, but it 
is unclear how the claim should be rejected. Alternatively, if there is more than 
one point of novelty, the test does not indicate how it should be handled. 
33 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03 (2014). 
34 See Application of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889–92 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
35 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
36 Id. at 64. 
37 Id. at 68. 
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point-of-novelty test,38  though it could be argued that the claim 
falls within the first category of In re Abrams because all the steps 
are “purely mental in character.”39 The Court left open the question 
of patentability of computer programs in general, but said the 
debate “indicate[s] to [the Court] that considered action by the 
Congress is needed.”40 
C. Parker v. Flook 
The Supreme Court’s next computer program case came six 
years later in Parker v. Flook.41 Flook applied for a patent for a 
method of updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion.42 
According to the majority opinion, “[t]he only novel feature of the 
method is a mathematical formula,” which is used to calculate the 
alarm limit that signals the “presence of an abnormal condition 
indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger.”43 
The examiner rejected Flook’s application because “a patent on 
this method ‘would in practical effect be a patent on the formula or 
mathematics itself.’”44 The examiner concluded that it was not 
eligible subject matter.45 On appeal, the Board of Appeals of the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTAB) determined the application 
failed the point-of-novelty test46 because the novelty was in the 
non-statutory portion, specifically the algorithm.47 The Court of 
                                                
38 See CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.03. 
39 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 166 (C.C.P.A. 1951). The steps are not purely 
mental in the sense that they are performed on a computer, but “[t]he 
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application 
except in connection with a digital computer.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. 
40 Benson, 409 U.S. at 73. 
41 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
42 See id. at 585. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 587. 
45 See id. 
46 See supra Part A. 
47 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 587 (“[T]he ‘point of novelty in [respondent's] claimed 
method’ lay in the formula or algorithm described in the claims.”). 
9
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Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed, deciding that the 
claim’s limitation to use only in catalytic conversion would not 
allow the patent to preempt all uses of the formula.48 Parker, the 
Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari.49 Parker expressed concern about the number 
of additional applications that would be filed because of the 
explosion of the software industry.50 
The Supreme Court explicitly said that the case turned on 
subject matter eligibility, and “[did] not involve the familiar issues 
of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and 
103.”51 The Court even assumed that Flook’s formula was “novel 
and useful and that he discovered it.”52 Though the method was 
clearly a process in the ordinary meaning of the word, the concern 
was that “[t]he line between a patentable ‘process’ and an 
unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.”53 Flook argued that 
the presence of a “post-solution activity” distinguished his case 
from cases in which only the algorithm is patented.54 In particular, 
the post-solution activity was the “adjustment of the alarm limit to 
the figure computed according to the formula.” 55  The Court 
rejected the notion that post-solution activity alone could 
distinguish this case from previous decisions.56 The problem, said 
the majority, was that allowing post-solution activity to establish 
                                                
48 See Application of Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev’d sub nom. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (“The present claims do not preempt the formula or 
algorithm contained therein, because solution of the algorithm, per se, would not 
infringe the claims.”). 
49 Flook, 437 U.S. at 587. 
50 See id. at 587–88.  
51 Id. at 588. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 589. 
54 Id. at 589–90. 
55 Id. at 590. 
56 See id. 
10
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patentability creates an incentive to append the broadest limitation 
after the formula.57  
In a six-to-three decision, the majority opinion held that “it is 
absolutely clear that respondent's application contains no claim of 
patentable invention.” 58  The majority determined that every 
element of the claim besides the formula was well-known in the 
art, and therefore “the claimed method [was] nonstatutory.”59 The 
opinion rejected the argument that the determination could be 
made under §§ 102 and 103, stating that these were not “the kind 
of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”60 Though 
the Court said the conclusion was “based on reasoning derived 
from opinions written before the modern business of developing 
programs for computers was conceived,”61 it appears they felt 
compelled to prevent this type of claim from entering the patent 
system. 
The dissent acknowledged that although “it may well be that 
under the criteria of §§ 102 and 103 no patent should issue on the 
process claimed in this case,” the method did fit under the process 
requirement of § 101.62 According to the dissent, the problem with 
the majority’s formulation was that “it strikes what seems to me an 
equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by 
importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of 
novelty and inventiveness.”63 The dissent was referring to the 
                                                
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 594. 
59 Id. at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)). 
60 Id. at 593. 
61 Id. at 595. 
62 Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
63 Id.  
11
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concept that determining whether the claim is novel must wait until 
later consideration under § 102.64 
D. Diamond v. Diehr 
Less than three years after Flook, the Supreme Court addressed 
subject matter eligibility again in Diamond v. Diehr.65 The Court, 
in a five-to-four decision, seemingly reached the opposite outcome 
as Flook.66 
Diehr addressed subject matter eligibility for “a process for 
curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the 
use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital 
computer.”67 Rather than updating an alarm limit as in Flook,68 the 
formula in Diehr's method was used to calculate the appropriate 
cure time for the rubber.69 Also unlike Flook, the formula was 
well-known in the art.70 The procedural posture in Diehr was 
                                                
64 Jeffrey A. Simenauer, Note, Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions: A 
Criticism of the PTO's View on Algorithms, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 902 
(1986). 
65 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
66 Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (“The question therefore of whether a 
particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls 
into a category of statutory subject matter.’” (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 
961 (C.C.P.A. 1979))), with Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (“Here it is absolutely clear 
that respondent’s application contains no claim of patentable invention. The 
chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are well 
known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use 
of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be 
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for automatic monitoring-
alarming.’”). 
67 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. 
68 Flook, 437 U.S. at 587. 
69 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. 
70  Id at 177 n.2. The method used the Arrhenius' equation expresses the 
dependence of the rate constant of a reaction on temperature. JULIA BURDGE & 
JASON OVERBY, CHEMISTRY: ATOMS FIRST 576 (2nd ed., 2011). 
12
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almost identical to Flook. 71  The patent examiner rejected the 
claims on the grounds they were drawn to nonstatutory subject 
matter.72 The PTAB, relying on Flook, affirmed the examiner's 
decision.73 Noting that “[n]ovelty considerations have no bearing 
on whether claims define statutory subject matter under § 101,” the 
CCPA reversed.74 Diamond, the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, sought certiorari from the Supreme Court.75 
Despite the glaring similarities, the majority opinion explained 
that the difference between this case and Flook was that the Court 
did not view the claims “as an attempt to patent a mathematical 
formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the 
molding of rubber products.”76 The limitations in the claim other 
than the formula (e.g., “installing rubber in a press,” “closing the 
mold,” and “automatically opening the press at the appropriate 
time”) were significant enough to compel the majority that the 
patent was for the entire process, not just the formula.77 
In dissent, Justice Stevens, author of the majority opinion in 
Flook,78 believed the patent was truly for an “improved method of 
                                                
71  In both cases, the patent examiner rejected the application, which was 
affirmed by the PTAB and later reversed by the CCPA. This was followed by a 
petition for certiorari from the commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. 
Compare Diehr, 450 U.S. at 180, with Flook, 437 U.S. at 587. 
72 Application of Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1979) aff'd sub nom. 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
73 Id. (“It is our view that the only difference between the conventional methods 
of operating a molding press and that claimed in appellants’ application rests in 
those steps of the claims which related to the calculation incident to the solution 
of the mathematical problem or formula used to control the mold heater and the 
automatic opening of the press.”). 
74 Id. at 989. 
75 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181. 
76 Id. at 192. 
77 See id. at 191-92. 
78 Flook, 437 U.S. at 585. The four dissenters, Stevens, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, 
J., Blackmun, J. were all in the majority opinion of Flook. Compare id. at 585, 
598 (dissenting opinion), with Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 (dissenting opinion). 
13
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calculating the time that the mold should remain closed during the 
curing process.”79 As such, he believed that it was non-statutory 
for the same reasons as Flook.80 In dissent, Stevens went even 
further by proposing “an unequivocal holding that no program-
related invention is a patentable process under § 101 unless it 
makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the 
utilization of a computer.”81 
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: MAYO AND ALICE 
Though Mayo82 did not involve a computer-related invention, a 
discussion of the framework used by the Court in Mayo is 
necessary because this framework was explicitly adopted in 
Alice.83 It appears that the Supreme Court has chosen to use the 
following test in Mayo for all inventions involving “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract idea[s].”84 
A. Mayo v. Prometheus 
The patent at issue in Mayo claimed a process for determining 
whether a given dosage level of thiopurine drugs is too low or too 
high for patients with autoimmune diseases.85 The representative 
patent claim consists of steps of (1) “administering” the drug, (2) 
“determining” the level of the drug present in the patient’s body, 
and then using the level to “indicate” if it is too low or too high.86 
                                                
79 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 206–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
80 See id. at 219.  
81 Id. 
82 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012). 
83 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) ("In [Mayo] we 
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible 
applications of those concepts."). 
84 Compare Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 with Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.  
85 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
86 The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court took claim 1 as representative. 
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (“A method of optimizing 
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Prometheus Laboratories was the sole and exclusive licensee of the 
patent.87 Prometheus sold diagnostic tests utilizing the patented 
claim to Mayo, but Mayo stopped purchasing from Prometheus 
and decided to make its own tests.88 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court reiterated a concern about 
“upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly preempt 
the use of a natural law.”89 Rather, the Court would only uphold 
those patents that have “transformed these unpatentable natural 
laws into patent-eligible applications of those laws.”90 The Court 
first determined that the patent describes a law of nature, 
specifically the relationship between the concentration of the drug 
and the likelihood that the drug administration is appropriate.91 The 
Court then asked, do the “claims add enough to their statements of 
the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as 
patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?”92 
In answering the foregoing question in the negative, the Court 
looked to the content outside the elements that claimed a law of 
nature.93 The patent claim was separated into the “administering” 
step, the “determining” step, and the “wherein” clause that tells 
                                                                                                         
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6–thioguanine to a 
subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) 
determining the level of 6–thioguanine in said subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6–thioguanine less than 
about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the 
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein the 
level of 6–thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells 
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered 
to said subject.”). 
87 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
88 Id. at 1295–96. 
89 Id. at 1294 (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853)). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1296. 
92 Id. at 1297. 
93 See id. at 1297–1305. 
15
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what the test “indicates.”94 The Court gave no weight to the 
physical process of administering, instead saying it “simply refers 
to the relevant audience.”95  The opinion further said that the 
relevant audience was already familiar with administering the 
particular drug and compared the administering step to a claim 
element that limits the scope to a particular technological 
environment.96 
Similar to the administering step, the Court did not consider 
“determining” to be anything more than a mental process.97 Again, 
the Court said the step was already practiced.98 Comparing the 
determining step to the post-solution activity of Parker,99 this pre-
solution activity was not significant enough to make the concept 
patentable.100 Finally, the “indicates” clause was said to merely 
“tell the relevant audience about the laws.”101 It did not apply the 
law of nature in a way that went beyond the law itself. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the patent claims were invalid 
because they “effectively claim[ed] the underlying laws of nature 
themselves.”102 
Following Mayo, it was unclear whether this new two-part test 
applied just to claims involving “laws of nature” or to more than 
that.103 In fact, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo, 
                                                
94  The third step includes the two “wherein” clauses that describe the 
relationship between the level obtained and what should be done. See id. at 
1297–98. 
95 Id. at 1297. 
96 Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)). 
97 Id. at 1297–98. 
98 Id. at 1297. 
99 See supra note 50 and related text.  
100 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
101 Id. at 1297 (“[R]ather like Einstein telling linear accelerator operators about 
his basic law and then trusting them to use it where relevant.”). 
102 Id. at 1305. 
103 See Joshua A. Kresh, Patent Eligibility After Mayo: How Did We Get Here 
and Where Do We Go?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 521, 521–22 (2013). 
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the USPTO created a test for determining subject eligibility for 
methods that use natural laws and did not consider computer 
programs to be affected.104 This uncertainty remained for more 
than two years until the Supreme Court again addressed software 
patentability. 
B. Alice v. CLS Bank 
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a patent 
involving computer programs to explain that the Mayo framework 
should be used to determine subject matter eligibility.105 Alice was 
the assignee of several patents that disclose schemes to manage 
certain forms of financial risk.106 Put simply, the patents claim 
                                                
104 MPEP § 2106.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012); see Bryan Wisecup, Mayo v. 
Prometheus: Reorganizing the Toolbox for Patent Eligible Subject Matter and 
Uses of Natural Laws, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1651, 1666 (2013). 
105 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
106 Id. at 2352. The patents at issue were U. S. Patent Nos. 5,970,479 (’479 
patent), 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375. The parties agreed that claim 33 
of the ’479 patent was representative of the method claim. 
33. A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, 
each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an 
exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for 
exchange of predetermined obligations, the method 
comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record 
for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a 
supervisory institution from the exchange institutions; 
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day 
balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit 
record; 
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, 
the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's 
shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only 
these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow 
debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit 
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using a computer to track financial data of two parties to determine 
if the parties would fulfill their obligations. The claims were 
drafted as method, system, and computer-readable medium claims, 
but Alice conceded that the “media claims rise or fall with [the] 
method claims,”107 and the Court gave no extra weight to the 
system claims.108 The dispute began in 2007, when CLS Bank filed 
suit against Alice seeking declaratory judgment that the claims in 
four of Alice’s patents were invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed.109 Alice counterclaimed, alleging infringement.110 
In 2011, shortly after the Supreme Court decided Bilski,111 the 
district court granted CLS Bank’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that claims were not patentable because they were directed 
to an abstract concept.112 A divided panel of the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                         
record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in 
chronological order; and 
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing 
ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits 
to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in 
accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted 
transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time 
invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions. 
Id. at n.2. 
107 Id. at 2360. 
108 Id. (“Put another way, the system claims are no different from the method 
claims in substance.”). 
109 Id. at 2353. 
110 Id. 
111 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). In Bilski, the Court held that 
applicants’ business method patent was an unpatentable abstract idea, “just like 
the algorithms in Benson and Flook.” Id. at 3231. 
112 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 255 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“The Court finds claims 33 and 34 of the ‘479 Patent and each claim of the 
‘510 Patent, ‘720 Patent, and ‘375 Patent to be directed to an abstract idea under 
the Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Bilski Supreme Court line of precedent. 
Accordingly, these claims are invalid as being directed to patent-ineligible 
subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act.”). 
18
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reversed, holding that it was not “manifestly evident” that Alice’s 
claims were directed to an abstract idea.113 The Federal Circuit 
then granted rehearing en banc, vacated the opinion, 114   and 
affirmed the judgment of the district court.115 Seven of the ten 
Federal Circuit judges concluded that Alice’s “method and 
computer-readable medium claims are patent ineligible.”116 Five 
judges concluded that the system claims are patent ineligible.117 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.118  Justice 
Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court 119  and Justice 
Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg 
and Justice Breyer.120  
Justice Thomas declared that the Mayo two-part test 
distinguishes “patents that claim laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.”121 The Mayo test first 
establishes whether or not the claims are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept.122 Part two of the Mayo test requires that the 
                                                
113 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 685 F.3d 1341, 1352 (2012) ("In light of the 
foregoing, this court holds that when—after taking all of the claim recitations 
into consideration—it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a 
patent ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to 
be inadequate under § 101.”) vacated en banc, 484 Fed. Appx. 559 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
114 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 484 Fed. Appx. 559, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
115 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) and aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
116 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2353 (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d 
1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 2354. 
119 Id. at 2351. 
120 Id. at 2360–61. 
121 Id. at 2355. 
122 Id. 
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claims “contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ 
the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”123 
Thomas applied part one of the Mayo test to Alice’s claims and 
determined that they were “drawn to the abstract idea of 
intermediated settlement.”124 Thomas compared the claims at issue 
to the risk hedging claims in Bilski and determined that 
“intermediated settlement, like hedging [in Bilski], is an ‘abstract 
idea’ beyond the scope of § 101.”125 The opinion, however, does 
not elaborate on a definition of abstract concept126:  
In any event, we need not labor to delimit the 
precise contours of the “abstract ideas” category in 
this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no 
meaningful distinction between the concept of risk 
hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated 
settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within 
the realm of “abstract ideas” as we have used that 
term.127 
Regarding part two of the test, which requires an inventive 
concept, the majority held that “the claims at issue amount to 
‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the 
abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, 
generic computer.”128 The opinion describes previous applications 
of part two of the Mayo test, in which Mayo,129 Benson,130 and 
Flook131 claims failed because they did not have an inventive 
                                                
123 Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)). 
124 Id. at 2355. 
125 Id. at 2356. 
126 Id. at 2357. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2360 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). 
129 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
130 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
131 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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concept.132 The exception was the inventive application of an 
abstract concept in Diehr.133 Thomas asserts that the claims that 
failed part two merely say “apply it with a computer,”134 or limit 
the use of an abstract idea “to a particular technological 
environment.”135 He concluded that the claims at issue were no 
different.136 
After determining that the method claims failed the Mayo test, 
the Court stated that the computer-readable medium and system 
claims were also unpatentable subject matter for “substantially the 
same reasons.”137 Alice conceded that its media claims rose and 
fell with its method claims.138 As for the system claims, the Court 
held that “none of the hardware recited by the system claims 
‘offer[ed] a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking the use 
of the method to a particular technological environment.’” 139 
Accordingly, the Court held that these claims were also patent-
ineligible subject matter under § 101.140 
In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, said that “any ‘claim that 
merely describes a method of doing business’” is not a “process” 
                                                
132 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357–58. 
133 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“The 
temperature measurements were then fed into a computer, which repeatedly 
recalculated the remaining cure time by using the mathematical equation. These 
additional steps, we recently explained, ‘transformed the process into into an 
inventive application of the formula.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
134 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350. 
135 Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)). 
136 Id. at 2351. 
137 Id. at 2360. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230) (alteration in original). 
140 Id. 
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under § 101.141 Accordingly, they too consider the claims at issue 
patent ineligible under § 101.142 
IV. HOW THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
CAN ADAPT THE ALICE TEST 
Though the Supreme Court left some uncertainty in how to 
apply the test,143 the Court was clear when it should be followed.144 
The Federal Circuit is bound by stare decisis principles145 to apply 
the “framework” articulated in Mayo and Alice to cases involving 
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”146 While 
commentators may protest the Alice and Mayo opinions, the reality 
is that courts must follow the Court’s analysis. However, because 
of the ambiguity in the framework articulated by the Supreme 
Court, the Federal Circuit can formulate a new test as long as it 
still contains the principles laid out in Alice; the new test should be 
administrable by both lower courts and the patent office. 
A. Objective of the Alice Test 
In the Alice and Mayo opinions, the Court repeatedly reiterated 
concern about allowing patents to claim the “building blocks of 
                                                
141 Id. at 2360–61 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3222). 
142 Id. 
143 See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Valve Corp., No. SACV 13-1874-GW(FFMx), 2014 
WL 4772200, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (“So, the two-step test may be 
more like a one step test evocative of Justice Stewart's most famous phrase. . . . 
‘I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to 
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .’” (quoting 
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
144 Id. (“[B]efore Alice, it was unclear to some, including the USPTO, that the 
framework set forth in Mayo applied to abstract ideas as well as to the law of 
nature/natural phenomena at issue in Mayo.”). 
145 See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 
F.3d 1272, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Federal Circuit review, and in particular this 
Court's application of stare decisis, is critical to such uniformity.”).   
146 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
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human ingenuity.”147 Therefore, when evaluating claims involving 
algorithms like those described previously, the Court has declared 
the claims unpatentable according to § 101, 148  rather than 
invalidating the claims for lack of novelty or obviousness. It may 
be that the patent claims at issue in each of the cases detailed in 
depth are invalid due to lack of novelty or obviousness. 149 
However, the Court’s grant of the writ of certiorari in these cases 
limited to the issue to the scope of patentable subject matter.150 The 
question presented to the Court limits its holding151 to § 101 and 
delays the question of § 102 and § 103 to remand. Though that is a 
possible explanation, it seems more likely that the Court chose to 
use § 101 subject matter eligibility to rein in the boundaries of the 
patent system.152 
                                                
147 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. 
148 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2524 (1978) (“This case turns 
entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which describes 
the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 210–11 (1981) (“What I believe does explain today’s holding is a 
misunderstanding of the applicants’ claimed invention and a failure to recognize 
the critical difference between the ‘discovery’ requirement in § 101 and the 
‘novelty’ requirement in § 102.”). 
149 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“[I]t may later be determined that the 
respondents’ process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to 
satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under 
§ 103.”). 
150 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (“The question presented is whether these 
claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”). 
151 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954) (“The Court's consideration 
will be limited to the question presented by the petition for the writ of 
certiorari.”). 
152 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 650 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he functional case that patents promote progress generally is stronger for 
subject matter that has ‘historically been eligible to receive the protection of our 
patent laws’ than for methods of doing business.”) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 
184); George R. McGuire & Blaine T. Bettinger, How the Supreme Court Got It 
Right in Mayo v. Prometheus, 10 NO. 1 ABA SCITECH LAW. 12, 15 (2013). 
23
Fermoyle: Adapting Alice: How to Formulate a Repeatable Test Based on Alice
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
223 ADAPTING ALICE  [6:2 2015]  
   
 
   
  
 
The Constitution grants Congress the authority to develop 
patent and copyright laws. 153  Congress has passed legislation 
directing what is patentable. 154  The statute for subject matter 
eligibility lists only certain categories that can be patented.155 The 
remaining things and concepts in the universe that are not included 
in Congress’s choice of subject matter eligibility consequently are 
not eligible for patent protection.156 The categories designated by 
Congress have been further limited by judicial interpretation.157 
Though Congress did not make the “implicit exceptions,” 158 
Congress also has not overruled the continuing precedent of the 
Supreme Court.159  
The goal of these exceptions to patentability is to stop those 
who try to acquire exclusive rights over more than they have 
                                                
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
154 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
155  See id. (“[A]ny new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”). 
156 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(“To a limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine not only what is 
protected, but also what is free for all to use.”). See generally MOY, supra note 
8, § 5:1. 
157 See e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be 
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”). 
158 See Wesley D. Markham, How to Explain the “Implicit Exceptions” to 
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 355 (2014). 
159 See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.01 (“Despite the controversies at that 
time [of the America Invents Act] concerning the ‘exceptions’ to Section 101 for 
abstract ideas and natural phenomena as applied to subject matter such as 
business methods, computer software, and isolated DNA, including human 
genes, Congress chose not to address directly questions regarding patent eligible 
subject matter.”). 
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actually invented.160 This occurs when patents are granted for a 
law of nature, for example. The Court, in multiple opinions, has 
used Einstein’s discovery of E = MC2 as an example of an 
unpatentable abstract idea.161 If Einstein could obtain a patent on 
the formula, simply because he discovered the laws that it obeys, it 
could be used to stop any innovation that harnesses those laws.162 
This outcome would have a deleterious effect on innovation.163 
Harmful outcomes like this are also why the Supreme Court has 
articulated the implicit exceptions to § 101.164 
B. How to Square Diehr with Alice 
The holding in Diehr seems directly contrary to Alice,165 yet 
the majority opinion in Alice took the stance that the outcome of 
                                                
160 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“If there is to be invention 
from . . . a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a 
new and useful end.” (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 130 (1948))). 
161 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1293 (2012); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
162 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.  
163 See generally The Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The 
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy Executive Summary, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 861, 864 (2004) (“[I]f patent law were to allow patent 
on ‘obvious’ inventions, it could thwart competition that might have developed 
based on the obvious technology.”). 
164 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (“[Claiming] 
the building blocks of human ingenuity . . . would risk disproportionately tying 
up the use of the underlying ideas, and [is] therefore ineligible for patent 
protection.” (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
165 Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (“It is [‘process’] 
which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning we may not be 
unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform 
us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the 
sun that is made by man.’”(quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952)), with 
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (“We hold that . . . merely requiring generic computer 
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
invention.”). 
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Diehr is consistent.166 A closer look at the language of Diehr 
shows that it actually succeeds on the first step of the framework in 
Alice because, as characterized by the majority, it is not directed to 
an abstract idea.167 The Alice majority said “[f]irst, we determine 
whether the claims at issue are directed to [a] patent-ineligible 
concept.”168 According to the Court, the claims in Diehr are not 
directed to a patent-ineligible concept.169 In Diehr, the opinion 
states the claims are a “process of curing synthetic rubber.”170  
Curing synthetic rubber, though probably well-known in the art,171 
is certainly a patent eligible concept.172 Since step one of the Alice 
test is concerned with the “concept” the claim is “directed to,”173 
the adjudicator need not move on to step two of the framework, 
which searches for an inventive concept for the process in Diehr. 
Indeed, the opinion in Diehr even says it considers the claim “to be 
drawn to an industrial process.”174 However, according to the 
dissent’s formulation of the claim in Diehr, an “improved method 
of calculating the time that the mold should remain closed during 
the curing process,” the subject matter is likely directed to a 
patent-ineligible concept, specifically calculating time. 175  The 
                                                
166 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“These additional steps, we recently explained, 
‘transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula.’”) 
(quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299). 
167  See generally Robert R. Sachs, How to Correctly Apply the Alice 
Examination Guidance, BILSKI BLOG (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2014/09/applying-alice-guidelines.html. 
168 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (emphasis added). 
169 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. 
170 Id. 
171 The majority conceded that the claims may later be found to be anticipated. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“[I]t may later be determined that the respondents' 
process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the 
statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103.”). 
172 See, e.g., Self-Curing Synthetic Rubber, U.S. Patent No. 2,776,269 (filed 
Dec. 19, 1952). 
173 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
174 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. 
175 Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Diehr claim is a prime example of the ambiguity associated with 
the first inquiry of the Alice test. Additionally, once an adjudicator 
determines what the claim is directed toward, the adjudicator may 
ignore potential claim limitations.176 
C. Why the Alice Test is Flexible 
The framework handed down in Mayo and Alice leaves 
significant room for interpretation.177 The ambiguity of the test’s 
first step, to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to 
a patent-ineligible concept ,”178 creates two questions. First, what is 
the claim directed to? And second, is that concept patent 
ineligible? The previous discussion regarding Diehr179 illustrates 
an issue with the first question: the same claim could be interpreted 
in multiple ways.180 To determine the second question of this first 
step, one must know which patent concepts are ineligible. The 
Alice opinion itself gives some guidance on ineligible concepts,181 
but declines to “delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ 
category.”182  
The second step of the Alice test, “a search for an inventive 
concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 
                                                
176 See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (describing claim construction and the use 
of claim limitations). 
177 See generally Eric W. Guttag, The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and 
Mayo: Why We Urgently Need to Return to Principles of Diehr and 
Chakrabarty, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/9/25/broken-patent-eligibility-test-of-alice-
and-mayo/id=51370/; Kresh, supra note 103. 
178 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
179 See supra Part IV.B. 
180  With the result that the characterization of the claim is outcome 
determinative. 
181 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57 (holding computing alarm limits, and 
hedging risk, intermediated settlement as abstract ideas outside the scope of 35 
U.S.C. § 101). 
182 Id. at 2357. 
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sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept 
itself”—leaves open the inquiry about what constitutes 
“significantly more.”183 The guidance for step two lies in Mayo,184 
Benson, 185  Flook, 186  Diehr, 187  and Alice. 188  Of these five 
representative cases, only Diehr can illustrate what the Supreme 
Court considers “significantly more” because Diehr was the only 
case that the Court says succeeded in the second step.189 Further 
confounding the problem, the claims in Diehr could be considered 
outside the scope of step two of the Alice test since they are 
directed to curing rubber. 190  Accordingly, the guidance to be 
gained from Alice amounts to “‘apply it’ [on a computer] is not 
enough” and “limiting the use . . . ‘to a particular technological 
environment’” is not enough.191 What is enough? Based on the 
guidance Alice provided, perhaps anything more than “apply it on 
a computer” or limitation “to a particular technological 
environment” would be enough.192 
The ambiguity illustrated by the foregoing analysis of the Alice 
framework presents an opportunity for the judiciary to adapt the 
existing test for statutory subject matter based on interpretation.193 
According to basic patent law principles, claim evaluation should 
                                                
183 Id. at 2355 (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2011)). 
184 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (treatment of autoimmune diseases). 
185 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (computer implementation of 
algorithm). 
186 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (updating alarm limits). 
187 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (curing synthetic rubber). 
188 Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (intermediated settlement performed by a generic 
computer). 
189 See id. at 2358. 
190 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192. (discussion in step one defining the method as 
directed to an industrial process versus calculating time for curing rubber). 
191 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted). 
192 See generally Kresh, supra note 103. 
193 See infra Part IV.D. 
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avoid intermixing the consideration of novelty and non-
obviousness with the determination of eligible subject matter.194 
The rest of this section sets forth a proposed flow of examination 
that utilizes the Alice test for subject matter eligibility but is in 
“conformity with the basic principles of patent law.” 195  The 
proposed test postpones the novelty and obviousness inquiry until 
after a determination of subject matter eligibility has been made.  
D. Proposed Adaption of Alice 
This author proposes a test that could be adopted by the 
Federal Circuit that is compliant with Alice,196 yet administrable by 
lower courts and patent examiners. In the proposed test, the first 
step to determine subject matter eligibility under § 101, similar to 
the Alice framework, is to identify elements in the claim that are 
covered by the implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural 
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas,”197 or those that are otherwise non-
statutory under § 101.198 Note that this is not at all the same as the 
claim being “directed toward” ineligible subject matter199 because 
the proposed test evaluates each of the claim elements 
independently to identify whether each individual element of the 
claim is statutory or non-statutory. This extra step accounts for the 
fact that the claim as a whole may not be “directed toward” one 
                                                
194 See CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.03. 
195 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 599 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
196 See supra Part B. 
197 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013)). 
198 For example, a poem is non-statutory under § 101 and should instead be the 
subject of copyright protection. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 33, § 1.01 (“The 
general purpose of the statutory classes of subject matter is to limit patent 
protection to the field of applied technology, what the United States Constitution 
calls ‘the useful arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.)). 
199 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
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single concept.200 Additionally, determining what an entire claim is 
“directed toward” can be very subjective and ignores claim 
limitations,201 which is contrary to the principles of peripheral 
claiming. The outcome of determining what a claim is “directed 
toward” could determine the test’s final result. For example, in 
Diehr, the majority asserted that the claim was directed toward 
curing rubber,202 whereas the dissent characterized the invention as 
an improved method of calculating time for the curing of rubber.203 
Both sides made good arguments, but this shows how the 
characterization of what a claim is “directed towards” can be 
dispositive.  
Under the proposed test, an adjudicator would classify 
elements as either non-statutory or statutory. When an element of a 
claim is classified non-statutory, the offending element, for the 
purpose of subject matter eligibility under § 101, is classified 
“known in the art.” The Supreme Court has long implicitly used 
this step.204 Another way of saying that an element is “known in 
the art” is that the element should be left within the public 
domain.205 The objective of the proposed test is to avoid granting 
exclusivity to an invention comprised solely of these abstract 
                                                
200 See generally Mark A. Litman, Deficiencies in the Design and USPTO 
Application of Mayo Collaborative Services v, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 
95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 47 (2013) (noting the difficulty in 
determining when a claim is directed toward laws of nature). 
201 See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (discussing the “all limitations” rule). 
202 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
203 Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
204 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (“Whether the 
algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention . . 
. it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”); O’Reily v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 116 (1853) (“But after much consideration, it was finally 
decided that this principle must be regarded as well known. . . .”). 
205 See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) 
(“An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in 
the public domain. . . .”). 
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elements. As in Alice, with enough “additional features” the 
invention as a whole may be transformed into an “inventive 
concept” that is eligible for patent protection.206 The test provides a 
procedure to determine what precisely is required for this 
transformation. 
After the claim’s non-statutory elements are identified and 
classified, the next step of the proposed test is to determine if there 
are statutory elements to the claim that are necessary to the 
invention.207 This check is meant to prevent patentability from 
“depend[ing] simply on the draftsman’s art.” 208  The necessity 
determination rules out limitations that are merely “[pre- or] post-
solution activity”209 or are not required for the operation of the 
overall invention. An adjudicator would then deem these necessary 
statutory elements to be “known in the art.” After all the claim 
elements have been classified statutory or non-statutory, Mayo 
describes the conclusion of the test for § 101 eligibility: “What else 
is there in the claims before us?”210 If there are any remaining 
statutory elements (i.e. not deemed “known in the art”), then the 
claim passes the test for statutory eligibility under § 101. Indeed, 
this can be a low bar for subject matter, but it is far from the end of 
the test. 
Although it is unclear how the Alice framework would 
continue upon a finding that the claimed matter is eligible subject 
matter,211 using this test, an adjudicator must evaluate novelty 
                                                
206 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
207  This determination could be considered subjective depending on the 
technology area. The question to answer is: Can the invention accomplish its 
purpose without this element? If it cannot, the element is necessary.  
208 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593). 
209  Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that post-solution activity including 
“adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula” 
did not make the process patentable). 
210 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
211 See Samantak Ghosh, Article, Prometheus and the Natural Phenomenon 
Doctrine: Let's Not Lose Sight of the Forest for the Trees, 94 J. PAT. & 
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under § 102212 and non-obviousness under § 103.213 The test for 
subject matter eligibility under § 101 merely disregarded the 
elements that the test considers in the public domain—it does not 
establish novelty of the invention. The test sets a low threshold for 
subject matter eligibility,214 instead using the other sections of the 
patent code to block inappropriate claims. 
The elements of the claim that are squarely in the public 
domain, according to the test’s § 101 determination are not 
considered in further examination under §§ 102 and 103. This may 
seem like a violation of the “all elements” rule,215  but these 
elements are still considered if combined with statutory elements 
in a novel, non-obvious way. Without novel application or 
combination, these elements should not be protected by the patent 
system216 because alone they may “inhibit further discovery by 
improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”217 An 
adjudicator would consider, for purposes of novelty, the previously 
excluded elements if those elements add to the functioning of the 
invention. An example of this is the second step of the 623 patent 
                                                                                                         
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 330, 356-57 (2012) (discussing the boundaries between 
sections 101, 102, and 103 in determining patentability). 
212 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 
2253 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Do the given facts show that the product 
was previously ‘in public use’?”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)). 
213 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2253 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“Do [the facts] show that the invention was . . . ‘non-obvious’?”) 
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
214 Any statutory provisions necessary to the invention would be sufficient for 
proper subject matter eligibility. 
215 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 
(1997) (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to 
defining the scope of the patented invention. . . .”). 
216 In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ental processes—or 
processes of human thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they 
have practical application.”). But see Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. 
217 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012). 
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in Mayo, in which a determination is made of the concentration of 
6-thioguanine in the blood.218 This determination step can be used 
to orchestrate further statutory steps so it contributes toward the 
claim’s novelty.  
 
The test then proceeds by determining novelty under § 102 and 
non-obviousness under § 103, which require an examination of the 
prior art for the statutory elements and a comparison of the 
invention as a whole against the prior art. Other than this 
difference, the §§ 102 and 103 inquiries proceed as they normally 
would. Accordingly, a novel, non-obvious application of an 
algorithm may be appropriate. But simply applying the algorithm 
on a computer is not sufficient.219 The steps below sum up the test. 
§ 101: Eligible Subject Matter 
1. Classify elements that are naturally 
occurring, abstract, or not technology as 
“known in the art.” 
2. Classify elements that are not 
necessary to the invention “known in the art.” 
3. If there exist elements not “known in 
the art,” continue to step 4. 
§ 102: Novelty, § 103: Non-obviousness 
4. The elements classified “known in 
the art” are per se anticipated, but the novelty 
and obviousness inquiry can be satisfied by 
novel combination or application using all the 
elements. 
                                                
218 See id. at 1295. 
219 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (“Stating an 
abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines 
those two steps, with the same deficient result.”). 
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The proposed test is similar to what is sometimes referred to as 
the “blue pencil rule,” which conceptually removes all non-
statutory elements of the claim.220 The examination would then 
proceed with this purified form of the claim.221 The difference 
between the proposed test and the “blue pencil rule” is that the 
purposed test allows for the non-statutory elements to still be 
considered, if used in a novel combination or application. In 
contrast with the “blue pencil rule,” no matter how novel the 
combination of non-statutory elements is, the proposed test will 
never reconsider an element once it is removed. 222  Another 
significant difference is that the proposed test does not give weight 
to unnecessary elements in the § 101 analysis. 
To illustrate how the proposed test actually works, consider the 
following hybrid claim examples. The first example is a novel 
application of cryptographic security in software.223 Whether or 
not the algorithm truly is new, the proposed test would deem the 
algorithm element to be “known in the art” because it is an abstract 
concept. The computer system would not be classified “known in 
the art” since the computer and networking components are 
statutory and necessary to the invention. The test then continues to 
                                                
220 For detailed discussion of the “blue pencil rule,” see MOY, supra note 8, § 
5:67–72. See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (rejecting 
petitioner’s argument that Flook requires the “mathematical algorithm [to] be 
assumed to be within the ‘prior art,’” and instead saying that the “fallacy in this 
argument is that we did not hold in Flook that the mathematical algorithm could 
not be considered at all when making the § 101 determination”). 
221 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 28–29, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4040414, at 
*28–29 (arguing that “[b]ecause the “wherein” clauses of respondent's claims do 
not recite any physical step to be performed by a doctor (or anyone else), they 
add no patentable weight to the “administering” and “determining” steps”). 
222 Indeed, under this analysis, the draftsman would have no reason to include 
non-statutory elements because the only effect they could have is to limit the 
scope of the claim in an infringement action. 
223 See, e.g., System, Method, & Software for Cyber Threat Analysis, U.S. 
Patent No. 8,601,587 (filed Sept. 3, 2010). 
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the novelty and non-obviousness inquiries. For novelty purposes, 
the application of the algorithm on the system would be considered 
since it enhances the functioning of the computer. Evaluating only 
the allowed elements, the software as a whole would be considered 
for novelty and non-obviousness. Accordingly, if the entire 
invention in cryptographic security is novel and non-obvious 
against prior art, it would be patentable. The second example, 
which intuitively would be expected to be unpatentable, is a song 
(or book or poem) on a typical storage medium.224 The song, novel 
or otherwise, is not eligible subject matter. Rather it should be 
protected by copyright. An adjudicator should consider the song 
“known in the art” for § 101 criteria. The storage medium is 
deemed “known in the art under the test’s necessity inquiry 
because the song could be stored in some other medium without 
changing its function, so it fails subject matter eligibility.  
V. ANALYSIS OF ADAPTED TEST 
The new test should render the same outcome as the Supreme 
Court’s opinions in previous cases; this will ensure that the 
proposed test is effective and fits the legal landscape as it exists.225 
This section evaluates how each of the previously discussed cases 
would be analyzed using the proposed test. 
                                                
224 See, e.g., Compact Disk Musical Jukebox with Digital Music Library Access, 
U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2006/0153020 (filed Sept. 26, 2003). 
225 See generally Douglas Lind, A Matter of Utility: Dworkin on Morality, 
Integrity, and Making Law the Best It Can Be, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 631, 
648–49 (1996) (discussing Dworkin’s theory of interpretive fit and justification). 
“Any plausible working theory of legal interpretation . . . must be able to 
disqualify an interpretation that fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of fit.” 
Id. at 648 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986)) (internal 
punctuation omitted). 
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A. In re Abrams 
In re Abrams involved “petroleum prospecting.”226 The CCPA 
held that In re Abrams failed the point-of-novelty test because the 
novelty was in the non-statutory elements of “measuring,” 
“determining,” and “comparing.”227 Under the first step of the 
proposed test, these mental-step elements would be considered 
“known in the art.” The remaining elements involving “sinking,” 
“sealing,” and “reducing the pressure” are necessary to the 
invention because the mental steps cannot be performed without 
them. Because these elements of the claim are considered 
statutory, an adjudicator should continue the test with the novelty 
and non-obviousness inquiries. An adjudicator should continue to 
deem the first three elements “known in the art” for these inquiries, 
but a novel application may be possible. However, using prior art, 
it is unlikely that one would consider the application of 
“measuring,” “determining,” and “comparing” to the statutory 
elements as novel. Using the proposed test, one would at least 
consider this composition of elements obvious because at the time 
of the invention it was likely known that those steps would reach 
the expected outcome. 
B. Parker v. Flook 
Flook involved “updating alarm limits” based on the 
calculation using an algorithm.228 Here, the three elements of the 
claim involve “measuring,” “calculating,” and “updating.” 229 
Under the proposed test, since all three elements are abstract and 
therefore deemed “known in the art,” further examination is 
unnecessary. The claim fails the test under § 101 because each 
element of the claim is classified “known in the art.” The absence 
of any statutory elements automatically dooms this patent claim. 
                                                
226 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
227 See id. at 169–70. 
228 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
229 See id. 
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C. Diamond v. Diehr 
Using the proposed test for the § 101 analysis, the Diehr 
claim’s analysis would be similar to the majority’s analysis.230 The 
claim elements involving recalculating cure time would be 
classified “known in the art,” but the portions of the claim 
involving “curing synthetic rubber” would be statutory because 
they are necessary to the invention as a whole. Since there is at 
least something necessary and statutory, it is patent-eligible subject 
matter. As the majority alluded to, the questions of §§ 102 and 103 
patentability are “wholly apart from whether the invention falls 
into a category of statutory subject matter.”231 The formula used 
would be classified as “known in the art,” so the remaining 
elements likely would not be novel because curing synthetic rubber 
is known.232 Using § 102 or § 103, an adjudicator could easily 
come to the conclusion that curing rubber was anticipated by other 
inventions. Since the Supreme Court left this question open, this 
analysis will not address the question either. 
D. Mayo v. Prometheus 
To evaluate Mayo, the first step is to determine which elements 
are statutory. The Mayo claim is described in three steps: 
“administering” the drug, “measuring” the concentration of the 
drug in the blood stream, and “determining” what the 
concentration indicates.233 The only statutory step of the process is 
the “administering” step, as the other two are “mental processes,” 
so they would be classified “known in the art.” Using the test, an 
adjudicator should classify the “administering” step necessary to 
                                                
230 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981). 
231 Id. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). 
232 See id. at 191 (“In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents' 
process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the 
statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under § 103.”). 
233 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295 
(2012). 
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the invention and not merely “[pre-]solution activity.” 234 
Therefore, the claim survives the § 101 eligibility test. However, 
this step is the only statutory element, and the addition of two steps 
that are classified “known in the art” is not enough to create 
patentability under § 102 or § 103. Note that unlike the majority 
opinion, using this analysis, the “administering” step is not merely 
referring to the relevant audience.235 Using the test, an adjudicator 
should treat it as a legitimate step because, for eligibility purposes, 
it can be assumed that it is required in order to make the 
determinations of the rest of the process. The end result likely 
would turn out the same because the Supreme Court is correct that 
the claims at issue “effectively claim the underlying laws of nature 
themselves.”236 This validates the test because it reaches the same 
outcome as the Supreme Court, but the proposed test provides 
more guidance and structure about how to come to that conclusion. 
E. Alice v. CLS Bank 
Finally, the analysis comes to the most recent case, Alice.237 
Technically, the method claim in Alice does not recite a computer, 
but assuming the algorithm is run on a computer as the parties 
stipulated, one would consider the computer statutory using the 
new proposed test. 238  The computer is necessary, again by 
stipulation of the parties, so the claim is statutory subject matter.239 
For the sake of § 101, the algorithm steps would be classified 
“known in the art.” For the novelty inquiry, an adjudicator using 
the proposed test searches for novel and nonobvious application of 
known elements on a computer. However, the most likely outcome 
                                                
234 Id. at 1298 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978)). 
235 See id. at 1297. 
236 The determination step merely indicates a meaning of the data and does not 
command any action. Id. at 1305. 
237 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
238 Id. at 2353 (noting that “the parties have stipulated that the method claims 
require a computer”). 
239 See id. 
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is that with the new proposed test, one would find the use of the 
algorithm on the computer obvious because there is no other 
practical use of the algorithm besides “applying it on a computer.” 
The preceding analysis is not a complete examination of these 
claims, but rather it is intended to illustrate how the test functions. 
Though the test appears to predict the same outcome as was 
adjudicated, the test proceeds with a logical and replicable path. A 
repeatable procedure is necessary because the examination 
procedures need to be exercised by thousands of examiners at the 
USPTO.240  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International241 indicates the Court’s desire to prevent patentees 
from obtaining monopoly rights on abstract ideas.242 The holding 
in Alice may align with the greater needs in the patent system, but 
the “framework” identified in Mayo243 and reiterated in Alice244 
gives little guidance for lower courts and patent examiners about 
how to apply the framework factors. This article proposed a test 
that harnesses the strong points of the framework in a way that 
guides future examination with articulated steps. 
The Federal Circuit will have to follow the framework in Alice, 
and the proposed test is one way to follow it and attain a 
                                                
240 See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2011) (“No matter how incoherent or tortured relevant 
judicial precedent is, the USPTO must try to distill it into a set of 
comprehensible guidelines for several thousand patent examiners. . . .”). 
241 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
242 Id. at 2354 (“‘[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent 
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby 
thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. . . .”) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)). 
243  The Mayo opinion never actually refers to its methodology as either 
“framework” or “test.” See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296–97. 
244 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
39
Fermoyle: Adapting Alice: How to Formulate a Repeatable Test Based on Alice
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
239 ADAPTING ALICE  [6:2 2015]  
   
 
   
  
 
predictable result. The proposed test is straightforward to follow; it 
checks each element to determine whether it is statutory and then 
evaluates whether it is necessary to the invention. The test allows 
patents for non-statutory elements only when they “‘transform the 
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”245 Finally, 
the test isolates the issues of subject matter, novelty, and 
nonobviousness into three distinct questions.246 
 
 
                                                
245 Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). 
246 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981). 
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